Krieg in der Ukraine

[TrueKraut]

Ja also hat man es geschehen lassen, tolle Wurst

[Santiago Garcia]

Diese heimliche Aktion während eines aktiven Militärmanövers durchzuführen klingt auch ziemlich... dumm? Die Warnung wurde zurecht ignoriert. Im Nachhinein lässt sich natürlich immer leicht sagen, das hätte man doch ahnen müssen.

[TrueKraut]

Na dann ist ja alles in Butter, immerhin sind wir ja jetzt unabhängig von Energie aus Schurkenstaaten

https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/we ... d-100.html

https://www.dw.com/en/qatar-signs-gas-e ... a-63923323

[Mauswanderer]

Ja also hat man es geschehen lassen, tolle Wurst

Der Headliner

This article is more than 2 months old

deutet ja schon an, dass es da mehr Informationen zu geben könnte. Ein paar Posts vorher stößt man hierauf: viewtopic.php?p=262868#p262868

Im dort verlinkten Artikel findet man folgende Einordnung:

Weil das vom Informanten genannte Zeitfenster verstrich, ohne dass es zu einem Anschlag kam, habe Deutschland 2022 keine weiteren Schutzmaßnahmen für die Pipeline getroffen, erfuhren ZDF und "Spiegel". Auch hatten sich die USA bereits informell an Kiew gewandt und von möglichen Anschlagsplänen dringend abgeraten,

Ich will damit nicht sagen, dass man sich nicht besser hätte drauf vorbereiten sollen anhand der vorliegenden Informationen, bzw. die rote Linie gegenüber Kiew klarer hätte ziehen sollen (obwohl wir natürlich nicht wissen, was genau da kommuniziert wurde, haben wir zumindest keine Hinweise auf vorab kommunizierte und dann in Kraft gesetzte Konsequenzen). Aber ganz so einfach wie "war allen egal" ist es eben nicht.

[TrueKraut]

Aber ganz so einfach wie "war allen egal" ist es eben nicht.

Allen war es sicherlich nicht egal, leider weiß ich bei deutschen Behörden oft nicht zwischen Unwissenheit und Inkompetenz zu unterscheiden.
Ich würde mich dem Anschließen, dass zumindest in Zukunft die Sache aufgeklärt wird und man sich wenigstens formal irgendwie einigt dass sowas nicht nochmal geschieht.

Ich kann verstehen dass es den Ukrainern und Ukrainerinnen in den Kram gepasst hat, aber für Deutschland war es jetzt nicht so super stattdessen auf sauteures LNG umzusteigen welches BESTENFALLS aus den USA kommt. Fracking, Energieaufwand etc sind nur einige Gründe warum ich jetzt nicht sagen würde wir haben uns da ein Problem vom Halse geschafft.

[biaaas]

Mal ganz egal wer es jetzt war, die Umstellung auf LNG wäre doch so oder so passiert.

[TrueKraut]

Bei mir kommen die Kosten von diesem Affentheater leider an und mich ärgert das persönlich. Mal ganz egal ob das alternativlos ist oder nicht, es kann nicht jeder > 60k im Jahr nach Hause tragen. Sorry wenn ich hier Frust abgelassen habe, ich hab mir eigentlich Media Detox verordnet.

[GoodLord]

Na dann ist ja alles in Butter, immerhin sind wir ja jetzt unabhängig von Energie aus Schurkenstaaten

https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/we ... d-100.html

https://www.dw.com/en/qatar-signs-gas-e ... a-63923323

Hab jetzt auf die schnelle keine direkt vergleichbaren Zahlen gefunden, aber meines Wissens ist - zumindest für Deutschland - die LNG Menge nur ein Bruchteil dessen, was über die Pipelines gekommen ist.
Und nicht vergessen: Russland hat schon vor den Sprengungen den Gashan bei den Pipelines zugedreht. Die Preise sind auch schon davor gestiegen und Russland war vermutlich auch nicht ganz unschuldig daran, dass die Gasspeicher im Frühjahr 2022 so leer wie schon lange nicht mehr (noch nie?) waren. Übrigens hatte Russland auch danach noch viel mehr Gas liegen können (über die Pipelines über Land) aber das wollen sie wohl nicht.

Damit will ich weder die Verantwortlichen für die Sprengung entschuldigen (ich hoffe die landen vor Gericht), noch behaupten, der Kurs der Regierung wäre alternativlos gewesen, aber der Verantwortliche/Schuldige war, ist und bleibt Putin mit seinem Angriffskrieg. Ich finde das wird bei allem berechtigten und unberechtigten Frust viel zu oft aus den Augen verloren.

Persönlich bin ich auch der Meinung, es war, ist und bleibt richtig, dass wir versuchen uns unabhängiger von Russland und insbesondere russischem Gas zu machen. Dass das nicht so schnell, vollständig oder schmerzlos geht, wie man sich das wünschen würde und wir dafür andere Übel in Kauf nehmen müssen ist klar aber ändert an meiner Meinung nichts.

[TrueKraut]

Die Preise sind auch schon davor gestiegen und Russland war vermutlich auch nicht ganz unschuldig daran, dass die Gasspeicher im Frühjahr 2022 so leer wie schon lange nicht mehr (noch nie?) waren.

Das war ein weiterer Skandal und ist ein Beweis dafür das wir schon lange schlecht Regiert werden. Die Russen erkennen unsere Schwächen und nutzen das aus und sie sind bei weitem nicht die einzigen.

Deutschland hat derartig viel kritische Infrastruktur privatisiert dass es einem wirklich nachhaltig die Laune verderben kann.

[Santiago Garcia]

Hab jetzt auf die schnelle keine direkt vergleichbaren Zahlen gefunden, aber meines Wissens ist - zumindest für Deutschland - die LNG Menge nur ein Bruchteil dessen, was über die Pipelines gekommen ist.

Das ist korrekt, laut Malte Kreuztfeldt 5 Milliarden Kubikmeter mehr LNG-Import gegenüber 125 Milliarden weniger Pipeline-Importe.

https://twitter.com/MKreutzfeldt/status ... 01622?s=20

[Santiago Garcia]

Langer, lesenswerter Artikel von Mike Kofman und Rob Lee: https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/perse ... ee-months/

Auszüge, so sie mir relevant erscheinen, aber es lohnt sich, den ganzen Artikel zu lesen.

[...]

However, Ukraine’s recent gains illustrate that it has worn down Russian defenses over time, leveraging an advantage in fires and long-range precision weapons to steadily press Russian forces back from their defensive positions. That said, Ukraine will need to both break through Russian lines and exploit that success to reach its objectives. Much could be decided in the coming weeks.

As we and others predicted, this kind of operation was bound to be difficult and costly. Without air superiority, a decisive advantage in fires, and limited enablers to breach Russian lines, any military would have faced similar struggles in such an operation. This is especially so against a force that had time to entrench, preparing a layered defense replete with minefields and fortifications. Ukraine’s military changed tactics, from initially trying to breach Russian lines in a mechanized assault to taking a more familiar attritional approach that achieved incremental gains.

[...]

Ukraine needs more air defense, mine clearing, and similar enabling capabilities. Western assistance over the past 18 months has enabled Ukraine, but it has also limited Ukraine’s options, resulting in undertrained units having to go up against a well-prepared defense without the benefit of air support. However, the challenges of this are not only due to capability and capacity shortcomings. The Ukrainian military continues to struggle with scaling offensive operations, and conducting combined arms operations at the battalion level and above, with most attacks being at the level of a platoon or company.

[...]

Ukraine likely has more combat power available to continue the attack, but heavier equipped units were indeed committed early in the operation, and the initial attack was not mere reconnaissance or probing, but rather a focused effort to rapidly break through Russia’s forward positions. Indeed, 9th Corps’ 47th Mechanized Brigade is arguably the best equipped new brigade with Bradley M2A2 infantry fighting vehicles. Images also showed that Leopard 2A6 tanks as well as scarce Leopard 2R and Wisent mine-breaching vehicles took part in the brigade’s initial assaults, which indicated that the Orikhiv axis was the priority and not just a probing or diversionary action.

The initial assault fell victim to a myriad of planning, reconnaissance, and coordination issues, which have been widely covered in the news. However, as we explore these, it is important to note that any Western military forced to employ units with only a few months of training would have struggled with such challenges.

[...]

Some commentators had assumed the initial assault was not the main effort, and three months in, some still characterize the offensive as in its “early stages.” This reveals the continued problem with a lack of understanding of how Ukrainian forces typically operate. A Ukrainian brigade in the attack in practice is often two or three companies advancing, reinforced by armor, and support elements. A reinforced company or company tactical group is the main element of the assault. Even then, coordination is difficult and prone to mishaps, as the initial offensive illustrated. It takes an entire brigade to plan this kind of action. Significantly increasing the scale is a challenge for Ukrainian forces, especially among newer brigades who lack the experience and command staff training. The initial assault was the breaching effort, but it did not succeed.

[...]

Western criticism — often appearing in the form of anonymous leaks by officials — sometimes holds that Ukraine won’t mass forces and accept the inherent casualties in such an assault. This fails to appreciate the real constraints on that military’s capacity to employ forces at scale. The United States has been misinterpreting this as a failure to commit forces to the offensive. Ukraine’s challenges at scaling how it employs forces cannot be overcome by a few months of training and Western equipment. Ukraine’s military excels at mobile and positional defense. It is also highly effective in small unit tactics and in effective employment of fires to degrade the Russian military. Given the challenges the new brigades faced at the beginning, brigade assaults with multiple battalions instead of companies likely would have exacerbated coordination issues and led to greater losses. There is also a failure to appreciate that steep losses to the assault element can significantly impact a brigade’s ability to continue operations and the confidence of its command staff. This is especially so for newer brigades with non-veteran troops.

Ukrainian preferences stem from an understanding of where their strengths lie, given the organizational capacity, experience, force quality, and limited enablers to support a larger scale assault. Western training efforts have suffered from being overly compressed, but also Ukrainian units are not necessarily trained in the West the way they would actually fight in Ukraine, using the same systems, tactics, techniques, and procedures. This is in part because Western training efforts cannot necessarily replicate said conditions. All of this points to the need for future Western training efforts to evolve — to become better linked to the realities of this war and how Ukrainian forces fight it — but also for greater understanding of the operating environment.

[...]

Despite the natural tendency to focus on settlements liberated, the balance of attrition will prove more significant in shaping Ukraine’s offensive prospects than anything else. This war has consistently demonstrated the difficulty of orchestrating a combined arms offensive against a prepared defense, with attrition proving the key enabler for maneuver warfare. This is in part due to the inability of one side to attain air superiority over the other, but the issue cannot be reduced to this single factor. Given Russia’s layered defensive lines, minefields, and entrenchments, it was unlikely that the Ukrainian military will be able to attain a breakthrough without first inflicting high levels of attrition on the defending Russian force. That said, this process is not necessarily linear, and lines can collapse once available manpower is no longer available to defend them or reinforcing units cannot deploy in time.

To some extent this approach favors the way Ukraine fights, even though it is not representative of what Western allies may have wished to see. Ukrainian forces prefer sequenced assaults, making fires the decisive element and exploiting with maneuver, less so using fires as a supporting component of a maneuver force. Ukrainian infantry has been conducting assaults typically as platoon- and company-sized elements. This is painfully slow and by itself cannot generate momentum, but Ukrainian units are generally better than Russian ones in the close battle. Ukraine is also likely sustaining less attrition by operating in small, dismounted units, but it offers less of an opportunity to achieve a rapid breakthrough. Similarly, with penetrating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, Ukraine has been gaining the advantage in the counter-battery battle over time. Steady decimation and blinding of Russian artillery fire by targeting counter-battery radars have helped Ukraine establish a visible fires advantage.

[...]

Attrition makes for poor headlines, but it plays to Ukraine’s strengths, whereas attempting to scale offensive maneuver under such difficult conditions does not. It is, however, burdensome to resource, pressuring Washington to finally authorize dual-purpose improved conventional munitions — cluster munitions for lack of artillery ammunition available. Cluster munitions are a nasty weapon with lingering effects, but there is no other way to sustain Ukraine’s demands for artillery ammunition. This was a critical decision, extending the timeline available to give Ukraine’s approach the opportunity to succeed. They are also more effective against forces in the open and manned trenches. But the dual-purpose improved conventional munition stockpile is not just meant for the offensive. It will be used to sustain Ukraine’s war effort well into next year, until Western
production increases sufficiently. This suggests that the primary factors affecting Ukraine’s offensive could still be ammunition and force availability.

[...]

Despite appearances, Russia is not executing a true defense in depth. Russian forces are set up for such a defense, which enables a defender to degrade the attacker as they advance, trading space for attrition. They have constructed three defensive belts, minefields in between, communication trenches, and hardened defensive points in between. This was likely Gen. Sergei Surovikin’s vision (and his name provides the nickname for these defensive lines). But Surovikin is not in charge. Gen. Valeriy Gerasimov, the chief of general staff, is. He has consistently demonstrated poor military judgment and a weak understanding of what Russian forces can and cannot do, most recently in the failed Russian winter offensive. Russian forces have chosen to defend forward of the Surovikin line, concentrating their efforts on holding the first line of defense and the towns that anchor it. To be clear, the first line does feature extensive entrenchments, including tunnel networks. The follow on lines include machine dug trenches, anti-tank ditches, dragons teeth, and likely more minefields. The Russian decision to defend forward has favored Kyiv because it allowed Ukrainian artillery to attrite the Russian units deployed.

[...]

Ukraine cannot just interdict Russian supply lines with long-range missiles and press Russian forces out. If this was so, Ukraine would have little need for a major offensive in the first place. It could pummel away with Storm Shadow missiles and wait for the Ground-Launched Small-Diameter Bomb, with a range of 150 kilometers, to be deployed. Without persistent presence and reconnaissance over the routes in question, such interdiction does not work well in practice, and the munitions are not available to sustain it. In Kherson, HIMARS systems ranged Russian resupply routes across the Dnipro River for over four months. Russian forces were able to sustain themselves via a single bridge and a ferry network, eventually withdrawing over 30,000 troops. Russian positions in Zaporizhzhia are connected via land corridors running east and south to Crimea. Even when within range of tube artillery, supply roads have proven difficult to interdict, raising questions about what “fire control” can achieve. Indeed, the entire offensive in the south, and the long-running battle of Bakhmut, have played out with both sides’ positions barely a few kilometers from each other.

[...]

Much could have been done sooner by the West to increase defense industrial capacity sufficient to sustain Ukraine’s war effort. For example, European countries need not have waited 13 months to begin making serious investments in artillery production. The same could be said of scaling up training programs. Ukraine’s recent experience shows there’s more to creating combat-effective units than Western infantry fighting vehicles and more capable tanks. They have saved many lives, and Ukraine’s motivated soldiers can quickly adopt Western systems, but this can lead to the erroneous assumption that the time necessary to train cohesive units, and their commanders, can too be dramatically shortened. It is unclear why the training for Ukraine’s summer offensive had to be such a compressed effort, rather than something that was begun much earlier in 2022.

Looking at where the offensive stands today, Ukraine’s decision to attrit Russian forces via fires and advance incrementally with small units played to its strengths. This is a grueling fight. The combat power and reserves available to both sides will play a significant role in determining the outcome. Ukraine’s offensive neither is over, nor has it failed. Ukraine’s prospects depend on how well Western countries resource the Ukrainian war effort into the fall, replace lost equipment, and provide the necessary enablers — above all, artillery ammunition. Ultimately, in planning for their support, Western countries must also think beyond the offensive, rather than taking a wait and see approach. This includes learning lessons from this spring and summer to improve Ukraine’s chances in future offensives. Western efforts should be geared to the assumption that the war will continue well into next year, balancing long-term transition programs, such as the transfer of F-16s and scaled up unit training, with managing Ukraine’s more immediate needs.

The West ought to be introspective about missing important decision points, which had a profound impact on the course of the war, constraining everyone’s options later on. Decisions about future support should have been made well before this offensive even began, assuming that it was unlikely to end the war. Instead, another cycle of attritional fighting may ensue after this offensive, followed by yet another surge effort to restore Ukraine’s offensive potential. In short, the West has been unappreciative of the lead times required to reconstitute military potential or provide Ukraine with a decisive advantage.

The recent anonymous criticism by officials spilling select narratives in the press, rather than fostering an open discussion about Ukraine’s challenges and successes, reveals enduring problems in this war effort: The first, is a lack of Western understanding of how Ukrainian forces fight. The second, which is closely related, is an insufficient Western presence on the ground to enable closer coordination or even the invaluable understanding that could be offered by battlefield observers. Western capitals have sought to keep this Ukraine’s war, avoiding an in-country presence that includes contractor support or trainers. To be clear, there are Western contractors and companies operating independently in Ukraine, but this is not the same as a government sanctioned and supported effort. There is much more that could be done without becoming directly involved in fighting or deploying uniformed personnel on the ground. The hitherto cautious approach has clear limits to its efficacy. Western support thus far has been sufficient to avert a Ukrainian defeat, and arguably has imposed a strategic defeat on Russia, but not enough to ensure a Ukrainian victory. Independent of the outcome of this offensive, Western countries need to be clear-eyed about the fact that this will be a long war. Taken together, Western industrial and military potential greatly exceeds Russia’s, but without the political will, potential alone will not translate into results.

[TrueKraut]

"USA kündigen Lieferung von Uranmunition an Ukraine an"

https://www.stern.de/news/usa-kuendigen ... 02470.html

Deadly Dust (Todesstaub), ein Film von Frieder Wagner

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kLuR8UGco6k

[Mauswanderer]

"USA kündigen Lieferung von Uranmunition an Ukraine an"

https://www.stern.de/news/usa-kuendigen ... 02470.html

Deadly Dust (Todesstaub), ein Film von Frieder Wagner

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kLuR8UGco6k

Ich glaube, ich schaue mir keine "amerikakritische Dokumentation" von jemandem mit vielen Verbindungen ins rechtsextreme Lager an. Da Fact Checking zu betreiben wäre wohl arg aufwändig.

[Voigt]

Die Diskussion zur Uran Munition hatten wir bereits im Mai diesen Jahres genau in diesem Thread. Am besten einfach nach Uran im Thread suchen.

[TrueKraut]

Ich glaube, ich schaue mir keine "amerikakritische Dokumentation" von jemandem mit vielen Verbindungen ins rechtsextreme Lager an. Da Fact Checking zu betreiben wäre wohl arg aufwändig.

Ich finde weder bei google noch im Wikipedia Artikel zu Frieder Wagner irgendwas von rechtsextremen Verbindungen. In der Doku äußert sich unter anderem der NS Widerständler Siegwart-Horst Günther der ein hohes Ansehen genießt.
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siegwart-Horst_Günther


Edit: versachlicht

[Mauswanderer]

Ich glaube, ich schaue mir keine "amerikakritische Dokumentation" von jemandem mit vielen Verbindungen ins rechtsextreme Lager an. Da Fact Checking zu betreiben wäre wohl arg aufwändig.

Ich finde weder bei google noch wikipedia Artikel zu dieser Person irgendwas von rechtsextremen Verbindungen. In der Doku äußert sich unter anderem der NS Widerständler Siegwart-Horst Günther der ein hohes Ansehen genießt. Hauptsache immer schön drauf mit der Nazi Keule.

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siegwart-Horst_Günther

Du kennst ja offensichtlich Wikipedia, also vielleicht mal dort den von dir extra namentlich genannten Filmemacher nachschlagen und einfach schauen, wer so seine aktuellen Verbindungen sind?

Wagner veröffentlichte u. a. im Kai Homilius Verlag und beim Promedia Verlag.

Uncle Sams schmutzige A-Bombe, Compact Nr. 12/2012

(als Herausgeber zusammen mit Jürgen Elsässer): Uranbomben: Die verheimlichte Massenvernichtungswaffe. Kai Homilius Verlag: Berlin 2010, darin von Wagner die Beiträge Eine Art Vorwort, Zyniker der Macht und Hommage für Prof. Günther

Zur Uranmunition:
Auch die EU hat da mal ein Gutachten zu erstellen lassen:
https://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_ ... ndex.htm#8
Die Stufe-1-Übersichten gibt es dort auch auf Deutsch.

[TrueKraut]

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frieder_Wagner

Da steht einfach nichts von rechtsextremen Verbindungen.

Kleiner Tipp am Rande: Solches Material wirst du nicht bei Suhrkamp veröffentlichen, ich nehme mal an es läuft darauf hinaus.

Edit: versachlicht

[Mauswanderer]

Kleiner Tipp am Rande: Solches Material wirst du nicht bei Suhrkamp veröffentlichen, ich nehme mal an es läuft darauf hinaus.

Und warum nicht?

[TrueKraut]

Weil es geschäftsschädigend ist sich nicht im Sinne der transatlantischen "Freundschaft" zu verhalten.

Hier sind die rechtsextremen Verbindungen:

https://www.menschenrechte-koeln.de/ima ... 20dust.pdf

[Voigt]

Bevor die Spirale weiterdreht verweise ich schonmal vorsorglich auf Andres Post im Thread: viewtopic.php?p=253179#p253179
Paasend da ich ja gerade selber noch alte Uranmunition Diskussion nachlas und es da direkt auftauchte.

Hauptpunkte wären Forenregel beachten (vom Besten ausgehen und lieber neutral nachfragen wie was genau gemeint war) und hier im Thread weniger Chatmäßig Gedanken raushauen, sondern lieber gut ausformulieren.

Bedenkt aber, ich bin kein Moderator, seht es daher nur als Hinweis eines Mitlesenden.